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Abstract 
Author: Trevor Peterson 
Title: Effect of Time Pressure and Task Uncertainty on I luman Operator Performance 
and Workload for Autonomous Aerial Vehicle Missions 
Institution: Embry Riddle Aeronautical University 
Year: 2010 
Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) are being utilized at an increasing rate for a number 
of military applications. The potential for their use in the national airspace is also of interest to 
the Federal Aviation Administration, but there are some concerns about the safety of Hying 
unmanned aircraft. The role of a UAS operator differs from that of a pilot in a manned aircraft, 
and this new role creates a need for a shift in interface and task design in order to take advantage 
of the full potential of these systems. This study examined the effect of time pressure and task 
uncertainty ha\e on autonomous unmanned aerial vehicle operator task performance and 
workload. Thirty undergraduate students at Embry-Riddlc Aeronautical University participated 
in this study. The primary task was image identification, and secondary tasks consisted of 
responding to exents encountered in typical UAS operations. Time pressure was found to 
produce a significant difference in subjective workload ratings as well as secondary task 
performance scores, while task uncertainty was found to produce a significant difference in the 
primary task performance scores. The results were examined, and recommendations for future 
research are discussed. 
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Introduction 
Currently there are over 100 U.S. companies developing more than 300 different Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (UAS) designs (FAA, 2009a). Some UASs are able to remain in the air for 30 
hours or more because there is no need to land and change pilots. This provides a much more 
efficient method for accomplishing goals which require long mission times. Not onlv do current 
capabilities of UASs allow for the completion of tasks at less cost than current manned aircraft, 
they also offer the ability to perform tasks that are deemed too dangerous for manned aircraft. 
The military utilizes UASs to perform these "dull, dirty, and dangerous" missions to avoid the 
risk of losing human life. 
UASs are also on the verge of being utilized within the national airspace. There are currently 
very few UASs allowed to operate in limited areas, due to uncertainty with the safety related to 
operating a UAS (AIR-160, 2008). Once these safety concerns are alleviated, the capabilities of 
UASs can be utilized in a vast number of activities which have not as of yet been discovered. 
Border patrol, pipeline inspection, crop inspection, law enforcement, and a multitude of 
applications could be enhanced by the use of UASs in the future. The concerns about UAS 
safety revolve around the ability of a remotely located pilot to fly in a manner which is safe not 
only to the aircraft itself, but to everything in the vicinitv of the aircraft (Wilson, 2007). There 
are numerous arguments for research to focus on the differences between manned and unmanned 
flight with regards to level of safety (DeGarmo & Maroney. 2008; Duke, Vanderpool. & Duke, 
2007; Tvaryanas, Thompson, & Constable, 2006). 
Accident rates of UASs far exceed those for manned flight. While the idea behind unmanned 
flidit is to avoid the risk to human life, there is still a cost associated with losing a UAS. It is 
therefore prudent to discover the causes behind the high rate of accidents for UASs. and begin to 
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prov ide solutions to some of the issues. Because the military is the largest user of current UAS 
technology, most of the research has been conducted with military operations in mind. A large 
amount of this research points to human factors as an area which needs a considerable amount of 
further study in order to achieve a level of safety equal to that of manned aircraft (Williams, 
2004). 
Specific human factors issues associated with UASs involve the fact that the human operator 
has a significantly different role than a pilot in a manned aircraft. This new role requires a shift 
not only in personnel selected for the job, but the training involved, and an interface design 
which allows for the optimal cooperation between human and automation in order to achieve the 
full potential of the system as a whole (Nelson & Bolia, 2006). Research on interface design has 
opened up new areas of interest, including the control of multiple UASs by one operator. This 
requires a whole new way of thinking about the implementation of automation and how it affects 
the operator. The operator of a UAS must be able to monitor not only the state of the aircraft, 
but that of the aircraft's environment, as well as the control station. This heightens the cognitive 
demand placed on the operator, and effects on workload are expected. Certain interface designs 
may be utilized to mediate these effects and the impact of implementing these interfaces is an 
essential area of research. 
Previous research has looked at workload imposed during a multi-UAS controlling task. 
However, workload effects have been difficult to attain with regards to the number of vehicles 
being controlled (Liu, Wasson, & Vincenzi, 200S; Reynolds, 2009). This study will focus on 
using tasks common to the control of UASs to manipulate workload in the operator. 
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The first area of interest in the current study is the use of UASs for target detection. One of 
the main roles of UASs in military use today is one of target acquisition. This is made difficult 
by the technology currently in use, due to low fidelity imaging, inaccuracy of automation in 
target detection, and uncertainty associated with images (MeCarley & Wickens, 2005). All of 
these difficulties require the human operator to expend some level of cognitive resources in order 
to solve them and accurately designate enemy targets. The effect on shifting operator workload 
has ripple effects on other tasks necessary for the operation of a UAS. 
Another area of importance is time pressure effects on the workload of the operator, and any 
performance detriments they may cause. Current levels of automation can assist the human 
operator with many tasks, but when the operator's workload is already high, the assistance of a 
decision aid, and the time pressure it is associated with, may increase workload and therefore 
cause performance issues. The relationship between time pressure, workload, and automation is 
a complex one that has proven difficult to study. Research conducted on UAS operation found 
that participants rarely utilized the automation, even when time pressure was added and 
workload was increased (Ruff, Calhoun, Draper, Fontejon, & Guilfoos, 2004). 
The current study focuses on the workload imposed on a human operator during a UAS 
mission task involving varying time pressures and levels of task uncertainty. The studv will not 
only measure workload directly but include measures of performance in order to determine anv 
effects elevated workload may have on performing necessary tasks. In the next section the 
history of UAS development, as well as current and future uses of UASs, will be reviewed. This 
is followed bv a review of human-automation interaction and the human factors issues associated 
with it. In particular, this thesis is focused on a review of previous research on target acquisition 
and time pressure, and their effects on workload. 
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UAS Development 
There is no universal definition for a UAS, and the characteristics of UASs have evolved 
quite a bit since their inception. The Department of Defense defines a UAS as "A powered, 
aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle 
lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can 
carry a lethal or non-lethal payloacT, but the DoD excludes cruise missiles and other forms of 
ballistic vehicles from their definition (Department of Defense, 2005). The FAA on the other 
hand, defines UASs as an "Airplane, airship, powered lift, or rotorcraft that operates with the 
pilot in command off-board, for purposes other than sport or recreation, also known as unmanned 
aerial vehicle" The differences in the definition of UASs by these governing bodies can be 
attributed to the differing roles UASs play for each, as well as the many paths of development 
UASs have gone through before reaching their current status. 
Roles of UASs in the Past 
The concept of a pilotless aircraft had its beginnings in the last part of the nineteenth century 
with an inventor named Nikola Tesla (Neweome, 2004). Tesla was able to give a practical 
demonstration of wireless control with a torpedo which he marketed to the U.S. Navy. The Navy 
soon gave up on Tesla's radio-controlled torpedo, but his demonstration opened the door for 
other scientists to pursue the same technology in flight. One such scientist was Elmer Sperry 
who built on Tesla's ideas by using radio frequencies to control aircraft. The early development 
of unmanned aircraft was reliant on three crucial technologies: automatic stabilization, remote 
control, and autonomous navigation. Sperry was the first person to attempt to solve all three 
problems at once and, w ith the assistance of his son. was able to demonstrate the ability to 
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remotely pilot an aircraft over a certain distance and dive at a specified target. Because of the 
intention to dive at a target, Sperry s technology was referred to as an "aerial torpedo" 
(Newcome, 2004). With successful demonstrations to officials in the armed forces, unmanned 
aircraft sparked interest in military applications and the development of technologies used in 
unmanned flight were tied directly to the needs of the military. 
Spcrry's demonstration of an unmanned aerial torpedo that could be flown into an enemy 
target peaked the interest of the U.S. military, but the role of unmanned aircraft would soon turn 
to one of training. On the suggestion of British officials, the U.S. started flying unmanned 
aircraft as targets used for the training of pilots and anti-aircraft gunners to improve their 
accuracy and dog-fighting abilities. In the early 1960's, the idea of using unmanned aircraft as 
spy planes gained popularity, mostly due to the danger that pilots Hying U2 spy planes faced at 
the time. There were instances of U2 pilots being shot down over hostile territory, which made 
the need for operating unmanned spy planes all the more evident (Wagner &. Sloan, 1992). The 
cold war spurred on many more advancements in unmanned aircraft, including furthering the 
abilities of UAVs to perform reconnaissance missions safely, and the ability to carry and deliver 
lethal payloads. Once weapons are added to the abilities of the system, it is often referred to as 
an Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV). A graphical representation of the evolution of 
UAVs is idven in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. UAV Evolution (Department of Defense, 2001) 
After the end of the cold war, the United States spends less on defense and is more likely to 
be involved with peacekeeping and humanitarian missions rather than with full theater wars 
(Glade, 2000). With this role change, United States' vital interests are often not directly at stake. 
The policymakers are then given more flexibility when responding to situations if technology 
allows for the completion of missions without risk to human lives. Because of this distinct 
advantage of utilizing UAVs, one of Congress' goals for the development of UAVs states that 
one third of the aircraft in the deep strike force should be unmanned by 2010 (Department of 
Defense, 2007). 
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Present Roles of UASs 
The roles of UASs have expanded greatly within the military in the last few years, and every 
branch of the U.S. military now employs their own form of a UAS in their intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance operations (Cooke, 2006). UASs have played a major role in 
both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, and have done so without 
putting American pilots' lives in danger (Scarborough, 2003; Guidry & Wills, 2004). 
Although the military is presently the major arena for the operation of UAVs, there is a large 
amount of interest in expanding current roles of UAVs into domestic and commercial operations. 
The potential uses of UAVs are numerous in the areas of law enforcement, weather prediction 
and tracking, agriculture, national security, and many others that have not as of yet been 
explored. The future of UASs in the national airspace is questionable however, due to the 
differences in how manned and unmanned aircraft are controlled, as well as current regulations 
which are not designed for autonomous aircraft. 
Future Roles of UASs 
The largest hurdle to introducing UAVs into the NAS is the inability of UAVs to "detect, see, 
and avoid" other traffic (FAA, 200%). It is of critical importance to the FAA that UAVs don't 
come to close to passenger aircraft or endanger people in any way. The process of collision 
avoidance has many layers to protect aircraft. Figure 2 shows the various layers involved with 
collision avoidance, and demonstrates how "see and a\oid" tactics are a last effort due to non-
cooperative air traffic. 
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Figure 2 Collision Axoidance System (Taibeit 2007) 
Duke Vanderpool and Duke (2007) contend that the FAA is appioaching the pioblem ol 
detect, see and avoid ' in the wiong mannei The authois aigue that undei instiument flight 
conditions (those in which visibility is low and the pilot has to completely lely on the 
instmments in the aircraft), an unmanned aircialt is no diffcient than a manned aiiciatt Because 
manned aiiciatt still opeiatc salcly undei these conditions UAVs should be attoided the same 
access to the NAS 
Anothei major concern toi the FAA is the loss ot communication between a UAS and the 
icmote opeiator Cuirentk theie is no dedicated ci\il go\eminent piotccted fiequcnc\ with 
which to contiol UASs and most UASs use militaix licqucnucs (DcGaimo cV Maionex 200S) 
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Most UASs are designed to fly a holding pattern when the signal from the operator is lost, but 
this strategy can potentially cause problems in high traffic areas. 
What the FAA demands from UASs, is an equivalent level of safety with manned aircraft 
(Wilson, 2007). This means that accident rates for UAS flight must match up to that of manned 
flight. In order to achieve this, technology and human operators must work together to avoid 
conflicts with other aircraft. The FAA has issued sexeral Certificates of Authorization for flying 
UAVs in civilian airspace, but only under strict stipulations. The FAA has developed the 
Unmanned Aircraft Program Office, which reviews applications for flight certificates, and can 
issue special airworthiness certificates based on those applications (AIR-160, 200S). There are 
currently a number of organizations working on developing standards to define minimum 
requirements for UASs, in an effort to address the technological, regulator)', and performance 
issues with operating UASs (DcGarmo & Maroney, 200S). 
Human Factors Issues with UAS Operation 
The crucial issue in implementing state of the art technologies, such as UASs, is not one of 
hardware creation, but of the assimilation of sensor) inputs, the processing information pertinent 
to user goals, and translation of the user's decisions into subsequent actions (Oron-Gilad, Chen, 
& Hancock, 2006). This means that the main obstacle in successfully employing UASs on a 
wide scale is inherently a user centered one. In order to reach the full potential of these state of 
the art technologies, the initial system design must take into consideration the capabilities and 
limitations of the human operator. This includes the information provided to the human 
operator, which must support human perception, understanding, reasoning, and decision making 
in mission environments (Department of Defense. 2007). 
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England's earlx eltorts at dexeloping UASs weie often reteiied to as humans in the loop ' 
which demonstrates iccognition ot the human iole in the svstem (Nexxcome, 2004) That 
iecognition howexei, has not tianslated into equivalent lex els ol effort in dex eloping human 
tactois standards along w ith the adx ancement ot the technology The Scientific Advisory Board 
toi the U S An Foice has suggested that not enough emphasis has been placed on human 
systems issues, and iccommended that there be an increase in dexelopment of human systems 
concepts within UASs (Woich et al , 1096) 
Data collected tiom the U S Aimy, Navy, and Air Force, regarding the opeiations of their 
lespectixe UASs, rexeals that accidents among UASs are nearly double those among manned 
an craft (\\ illiams, 2004) Manx ol the accidents analyzed can be directly attributed to human 
factois issues A second studx looking at UAS accidents categonzed the human tactois issues 
piexalent in eunent UAS technologx (Txarvanas, Thompson, & Constable, 2006) Figure 3 
shows some ot the conclusions diawn horn the studx 
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Identifying human factors problems related to UASs can be difficult due to the fact that 
problems seen with one type of aircraft xvould never be seen in another. For example, design 
problems with the user interface cannot be generalized across different designs due to the fact 
that the user interfaces vary so much across different types of aircraft (Williams, 2004). The 
Department of Defense has stated that one of the mam objectives in the dexelopment of UASs is 
a common interface which xvould allow for greater interoperability (Department of Defense, 
2007). The current state of UASs is far from realizing this objective. While some UASs have 
been dexeloped with an interface which is similar to flying a manned aircraft, utilizing throttle 
and stick controls, others have very different interfaces than those in traditional aviation, and are 
not as much "flown" as they are "commanded" (Nelson & Bolia, 2006). These types of 
interfaces utilize a much higher level of automation, which represents a paradigm shift in the 
way controllers need to think and act when controlling a UAS. Ever increasing lex els of 
automation means that the human user takes on a role of supervisor, and becomes extremely 
dependant on an adequate interface in order to effectively control the UAS. 
Humans and Automation 
Manufacturers often attempt to automate the human "out of the loop" which means they rely 
on increasing automation in response to any issues that max arise (Cooke, 2006). This tactic 
does not however solve human factors issues with the control of UASs, but creates nexx' and 
distinct challenges to the operators. Even within highly autonomous sx stems such as UASs, 
humans arc expected to proxide high-lexel objectixes. set rules of engagement, supply 
operational constraints, as well as support launch and recoxery operations (Department of 
Defense, 2007). The use of automation can often cause adxerse effects in the performance of the 
operators using the system, if there is not enough attention paid to human factors issues. 
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The cause of these effects was termed "clumsy automation" by Werner and Curry when they 
were first observed in 1980 (Wiener & Curry, 1980). Since then, it has been recognized that the 
implementation of automation can change the way human operators perccixe situations in ways 
unintended by the system designers (Billings, 1997; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). The 
unintended consequences of the effects automation has on the human operators can then lead to 
human vigilance decrements, detection capabilities, limited system flexibility, and automation 
biases (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). These issues with automation provide a 
number of challenges to implementing highly autonomous systems such as UASs. Billings 
(1997) provides an ansxver to these concerns through a number of guidelines to human centered 
automation: 
• The pilot bears responsibility for safety of flight 
• Pilots must remain in command of their flights 
• The pilot must be actively inxolved 
• The pilot must be adequately informed 
• The operator must be able to monitor the automation assisting them 
• The automated systems must therefore be predictable 
• The automated sx stems must also monitor the human operator 
• Every intelligent system element must knoxv the intent of other intelligent system 
elements 
These guidelines establish automation as a member of a team, which must remain 
coordinated with the other team members in order to achiexe a common goal. This concept has 
been corroborated by Putzer and Onken (2001), xxho state that in order for the human operator to 
make effectixe decisions, the machine and human must interact dxnamically as a single sxstem. 
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Under these circumstances however, the human operator must still oversee automation to ensure 
accuracy of the decisions being implemented, particularly when unexpected events occur. The 
question of which functions to allocate to which part of the system, either human operator or 
automation, then becomes a difficulty. 
Function allocation has been defined as the assignment of required functions to resources, 
instruments or agents (Sheridan, 1998). The distribution of functions betxveen humans and 
automation has been a focus of human factors professionals for years. While automation is 
efficient at performing specified tasks, higher level functions involved with superx ising an 
automated system such as sensing unusual situations in the environment, detecting unusual 
stimuli, and goal oriented decision making seem to be better suited for human performance 
(Sanders & MeCormick, 1993). More recent function allocation strategies haxe focused not so 
much on dividing functions betxveen humans and machines, but designing the system in such a 
fashion that it produces an effective coordination betxveen the two (Hughes, 2008). Schulte 
(2002) recommends a similar approach, which leads to a cooperative system design between 
humans and automation in order to take advantage of the strengths of each. Figure 4 shoxvs 
examples of resources of different parts of a human-automation system which can be enhanced 
through man-machine cooperation. 
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Figure 4. Synergetic resources to be exploited through man-machine cooperation (Schulte, 2002) 
Previous studies on UASs have suggested that increasing the number of functions allocated to 
automation can result in a decrease in operator workload (Dixon, Wickens, & Chang, 2003). 
When highly autonomous systems are being used however, human operators can often rely on 
the automation inappropriately, trusting the machine to perform functions which may be better 
suited to their own strengths. This overreliance on automation is referred to as misuse, whereas 
not utilizing the advantages of automation is referred to as disuse (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). 
When automation is either misused or disused, the system cannot operate as efficiently as 
possible because the strengths of each component are not being fully utilized. The trend of 
system design seems to inevitably move towards increasing the level of automation to the 
greatest extent possible. This design strategy does not allow an adequate level of human 
involvement, and can lead to failure of the entire system. If the human operator is not able to 
perform the role of supervisor and act as a fail-safe, it can threaten the safety of not only the 
UAS itself, but anything else in the vicinity of the aircraft. 
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The level of automation implemented in the UAS then becomes an important factor in 
determining how safely and efficiently the system will operate in general. Management by 
consent and management by exception are the two most common design methods for 
implementing automation in a user interface. Management by consent is a level of automation in 
which the automation provides suggestions for action, but does not carry it out until the operator 
gives approval, while management by exception is a level in which the automation will carry out 
the recommended course of action unless the operator commands otherwise (McCarley, 2004). 
Research has found that there are differences in the benefits gained from these two levels of 
automation in a UAS supervisory monitoring task (Ruff, Narayanan, & Draper, 2002). The 
different benefits from the levels of automation come with different detriments to performance as 
well. Increased automation may decrease workload, but may also increase the reliance of the 
human operator on automation to the point that the automation is being misused. Decreased 
automation may have the opposite effect on workload, increasing it to dangerous levels, as well 
as reducing the ability of the user to rely on automation when it may be necessary. The goal 
becomes to design a system with an appropriate lex el of automation, which provides the operator 
with enough information to maintain situation awareness, but not so much as to increase 
workload. Chun, Spura, Alvidrez, and Stiles (2006) recommended a highly autonomous system 
with an interface which suggests appropriate responses to situations and factors in operator 
workload, especially during emergencies when workload becomes heightened. 
Workload 
Mental workload can be described as the relationship between the mental resources 
demanded by a task, and those resources available to be supplied by the human operator 
(Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2008). The implementation of automation can alleviate 
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excess workload for a wide \ariety of tasks, and has made possible many complex tasks which 
would be inconceivable otherwise. The operation of UASs in dangerous airspace is an obvious 
example of this, but how this high level of automation affects the workload of the operator is an 
issue which still requires further study. 
It is clear that appropriate use of automation within a UAS could potentially lead to the 
freeing up of human resources to perform more complex tasks for which they are better suited. 
Dixon, Wickens, and Chang (2003) found that allocation of flight control to automation led to 
higher performance on concurrent target identification and system failure identification tasks, 
which the authors attribute to the reduced level of workload. High levels of workload can lead 
to performance detriments, but it is important to note that workload levels which are too low can 
haxe the same effect (Crcscenzio, Miranda, Periani, & Bombardi, 2007). Often an operator 
experiencing low workload levels xvill lose track of tasks the system is performing, losing 
situation awareness, and inevitably causing performance problems. When the operator needs to 
become involved in the system again, such as during an unexpected event, workload increases as 
they attempt to regain the lost situation awareness. 
Not only can automation lead to a high level of workload, but situations which create high 
workload in the operator can lead to an overreliance on the automation. When workload is too 
high, and there are not enough cognitive resources available to support a calculated rational 
choice, operators can simply rely on automation to make a decision for them (Lee & See, 2004). 
This is often a misuse of the automation and can result in tactical errors. When these types of 
errors occur during UAS flight, safety becomes compromised and becomes an area of major 
concern. 
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Measurement of Workload 
Many methods exist to determine lexel of workload in a human operator, and can be 
categorized into four groups: operator performance, subjective ratings, analytic methods, and 
physiological measures. Improper procedures for measuring workload can not only fail to 
correctly detect lexel of workload, but can interfere with the operator and have an effect on the 
workload themselves. Workload measures need to be selected based on their sensitivity, 
diagnostic capability, and intrusiveness, as these are the most important properties to consider 
when implementing a measure (Eggemeier, Wilson, Dramer, & Damos, 1991). The sensitivity 
of a measure refers to the ability to distinguish betxveen different levels of workload. A measure 
that is not sensitive enough for a given task can produce results which show no change in 
workload where there actually is a change. Diagnostic capability refers to the abilitv to 
distinguish the source of the workload. This is particularly important in complex tasks xxhich 
inxolxe effort from multiple modalities. Finally, intrusixeness is the level to xxhich the measure 
interferes xvith the operator's ability to perform the primarx task. If the measure is distracting or 
impedes the operator from performing the primarx task, it is considered to be highly intrusive. 
For the current study, subjective measures haxe been chosen due to their sensitivity, high 
face validity, ease of use, and comparability. Previous studies haxe also utilized subjective 
measures, and demonstrated their usefulness (Liu, Wasson, & Yincenzi, 2008; Reynolds, 2009). 
As a subjective rating, the NASA-TLX will be used due to its sensitivity to individual 
components of mental workload (Hart & Stax eland, 19SS). 
Additionally, performance measures will be utilized in order to directly demonstrate 
differences in workload. Secondary tasks will add more workload in order to demonstrate the 
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upper limits of workload not achieved through the primary task alone. It is imperative that the 
secondary tasks do not intrude on performance of the primary task if they are to be reliable 
measures of workload. For this reason, participants were instructed that the primary task of 
target detection will hold priority oxer other tasks, and should be completed before attention is 
paid to the secondary tasks. 
Task Uncertainty 
The fact that human operators are physically separated from the aircraft in a UAS, can cause 
a problem referred to as out of the loop unfamiliarity in xxhich the operator lacks adequate levels 
of situation awareness needed to operate a UAS efficiently( Wickens, 1992). Specific problems 
include poor spatial resolution, limited field of view, low update rates, and delayed image 
updating (McCarley & Wickens, 2005). The unfamiliarity experienced by operators is a result of 
not only lack of v isual cues, but those from other sensory inputs as xvell. McCarley and Wickens 
(2004) studied some of the effects of remov ing the pilot from the aircraft, and termed this lack of 
sensory inputs "sensory isolation" The result of sensory isolation is human operators xxho show-
high levels of boredom, decreased recognition performance, and degraded target detection 
(Txaryanas, Thompson, & Constable, 2006). 
The abilitv to identify and locate targets in real time is a current shortfall of UAS technologv 
(Department of Defense, 2007). While manned aircraft haxe the advantage of a relatively wide 
field of view, UASs are generally limited to a few visual displays, from which the operator must 
be able to glean a large amount of information. When the capabilities of UASs expanded to 
carry lethal payloads, the importance of accurate decision making regarding target identification 
became infinitelx more important. The identification of targets is particular!}, difficult due to the 
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low fidelity and restricted visual angle available to UAS operators, and this is made ex en more 
complicated when the target lies amidst an array of distracting information, which is often the 
case w ith military operations. Uncertainty describes the condition an observer experiences when 
v icwing an image which contains confusing distracter items (Vierck & Miller, 2007). When 
there is a high level of uncertainty in the decision making process, humans will actively search 
out ways to reduce that uncertainty by gathering more information, and when all else fails, 
simply suppress the uncertainty and take action (Lipshitz, 1997). These strategies have serious 
implications in target identification. 
To alleviate the uncertainty associated with target identification, and due to the potential for 
high fratricide rates, many target identification systems have been developed. These systems are 
designed as an automated decision aid for the identification of fnendh troops, but it is not 
certain whether performance on target identification has actually improved because of problems 
w ith human-automation interaction (Galster, Bolia, Roe, & Parasuraman, 2001). Humans show 
difficulty relying on this type of automation appropriately, particularly when it is imperfect 
(Wang, Jamicson, & Hollands, 2009). Studies haxe demonstrated that when there is high 
uncertainty identifying a target in a visual display, by default, operators tend to rely on 
automation's ability to make the correct identification (Beck, McKinney, Dzindolet, & Pierce, 
2009; Conejo & Wickens, 1997; Dzindolet, Pierce, Beck, Dawe, & Anderson, 2001). The ability 
of technology to correctly identify a target is not as accurate as a human. This overreliance on 
automated target identification s}stems is onh exacerbated when a decision needs to be made 
quickly, as is often the case in combat operations. 
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Time Pressure 
In a time sensitive env ironment, decision making can become much more taxing on a human 
operator. Time pressure can have the effect of making a somewhat mundane task more 
challenging and therefore pleasurable. This suggestion is contrasted by more extreme states 
occun-ing when time pressure is so great that people consider a task impossible to complete in an 
allotted time frame (Maule, 1997). In either case, time pressure adds workload to a task, and m 
the latter case, that workload exceeds the capacity of the person performing the task. Time 
pressure may lead to the reallocation of resources from the decision process to stress coping 
mechanisms, change the goals in a decision situation, as well as modify the structuring and 
processing of information (Svenson, 1997). This reorganization of cognitive functions can result 
in an increase in workload associated with the time pressure. 
Research has demonstrated the increase in workload due to time pressure, and found that 
performance decreased as a result (Hughes & Babski-Reeves, 2005). This is particularlv evident 
in tasks which already present high levels of stress to the operator, such as target identification. 
Another study found that during a target identification task, time pressure resulted in degraded 
ability to distinguish friend from foe (Burke, Oron-Gilad, Convvav, & Hancock, 2007). 
Situations which cause this type of problem pose a serious threat to military operations through 
increased fratricide rates. 
Researchers have attempted to mediate the excess workload placed on humans when time 
pressure is introduced by utilizing decision aids. The most beneficial type of decision aid and 
the best method of implementation is still a topic of disagreement. One studx found that displays 
showing onlv status information were superior to decision aids in achieving optimal performance 
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on a decision making task during flight (Sarter, Schroeder, & McGuirl, 2001). The results of this 
study also point out however, that while performance xvas enhanced, time to complete the task 
was increased. When under time pressure, it may be optimal to provide actual command 
suggestions to the human to alleviate workload. One study found that in a target acquisition task, 
priming has different effects on performance depending on visual rclatedness of the prime to the 
target, and accuracy of the decision aid (Hailston & Davis, 2006). One drawback of 
implementing any type of decision aid, particularly in a task such as target detection, is the 
reliability of the automation. Time pressure can increase workload to the point that humans 
demonstrate an overreliance on automation (Glade, 2000). This implies that when time pressure 
increases workload, humans xvill trust automation to make the correct decision, even when it is 
known that the automation is not perfectly reliable. This seems to be a coping mechanism to 
deal with the added stress of time pressure. 
Summary 
The highlv autonomous nature of UASs has advanced the debate about the interaction 
betxveen humans and automation. The environment in which they operate, and the ability of a 
human operator to understand and control a UAS within that enx ironment, introduce a significant 
human factors problem. This is a problem which must be addressed if xve are to realize the full 
potential of this technology. One of the largest road blocks to the full implementation of UASs 
is a proper user interface which can alleviate some of the problems currently being experienced. 
In order to determine the efficacy of an interface, we must determine and understand the 
consequences for the human operator when using that interface. 
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The history of UASs demonstrates the industry's focus on developing the technology around 
task capabilities, with little thought for how the new technology affects the human operator. The 
reliance on automation to solve any and all issues which arise has caused a drastic change in the 
role of a human in the system, and little research to support the new role. The main area of 
importance with regards to UAS research revolves around the idea that the human retains sole 
responsibility for the system. Future design should implement a human centric approach, and 
construct the entire system outward from there. This requires a large amount of research into the 
most beneficial interface with regards to human capabilities and limitations. 
One area of limitation humans experience during the control of a UAS is workload, which 
can range from being excessive enough to cause performance detriments, to being too low to 
maintain vigilance. These workload effects are difficult to anticipate, particular!}' with new 
technology such as an interface which allows the control of multiple UASs. What is not known 
is how different tasks associated xvith UAS operation affect workload, and may potentially 
deteriorate performance. 
One of the most important tasks of a UAS is reconnaissance and target identification. This 
task is xvell suited for UASs due to the fact that the aircraft can fix above areas believed to 
contain possible targets without endangering human lives in doing so. The quality of images 
gathered by a UAS can be limited, thus creating excessive workload for the operator xxho must 
correctly identify any targets. The xvorkload is further heightened by the time pressure 
associated with typical UAS missions. Automation can relieve some of that workload by 
identifying the targets and making suggestions to the operator, but automation can be inaccurate 
in doing so. The human operator must retain supervisory control oxer the entire svstem. and 
therefore must be able to verily any target identification before allowing the automation to 
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execute any tasks. There is a need for further research into target identification tasks while 
operating a UAS, in order to understand the roles that should be assigned to either the human 
operator or the automation so that the full potential of human-machine interaction can be 
achieved. 
This stud}' addresses the effect of time pressure and task uncertainty on operator 
performance and workload while operating a UAS. The following hypotheses xvere formulated 
for this study: 
Statement of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: When participants arc exposed to high uncertainty targets, they will report higher 
workload than when they are exposed to low uncertainty targets. 
Hypothesis 2: When participants are exposed to high uncertainty targets, they will score lower 
on primary task performance measures than when they are exposed to low 
uncertainty targets. 
Hypothesis 3: When participants are exposed to high uncertainty targets, they will score lower 
on secondary task performance measures than when the} are exposed to low 
uncertainty targets. 
Hypothesis 4: When participants experience a three second time limit in target processing, they 
will report higher workload than when the} experience a six second time limit. 
Hypothesis 5: When participants experience a three second time limit on target processing, thev 
will score lower on image accuracy than w hen the} experience a six second time 
limit. 
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Hypothesis 6: When participants experience a three second time limit on target processing they 
will score higher on secondary task performance measures than when they 
experience a six second time limit. 
Hypothesis 7: An interaction will exist between time limit on target processing and uncertainty 
of targets with regard to workload. Specifically, when participants experience a 
three second time limit, task uncertainty will create less of a workload effect than 
when they experience a six second time limit. 
Hypothesis cX: An interaction will exist between time limit on target processing and uncertainty 
of targets with regard to secondary task performance. Specifically, when 
participants experience a three second time limit, task uncertainty will create less 
of an effect on secondary task performance than when they experience a six 
second time limit. 
Methods 
Participants 
Thirty participants from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University were recruited to participate 
in the study. Participants were offered extra credit in an undergraduate course in exchange for 
their participation and were asked to sign a consent form acknowledging their willingness to 
participate in this study (See Appendix A). 
, I ppa I'd t us 
The apparatus consisted of a standard computer running a UAS software test bed simulation 
device called MI1IRO (Multi-modal Immersive Intelligent Interface for Remote Operations). 
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The MIIIRO test bed has been previously utilized as an UAS simulator (Nelson, Lefebvre, & 
Andre, 2004; Tso et al., 2003). The software was designed by IA Tech with support from the Air 
Force Research Laboratory, and is designed to conduct research for and simulate long range, 
high endurance UASs. The setup included two monitors, the primary of which portrayed the 
Tactical Situation Display (TSD). The TSD included a topographical image of the operating 
environment, highlighted routes including waypoints, critical targets, other intruding aircraft, and 
the Mission Mode Indicators (MMI). The secondary monitor displayed the Image Management 
Display (IMD) which includes an image cue and image display used for target acquisition. 
Figure 5 shows the MIIIRO interface. 
sum 
Figure 5. MIIIRO Testbed Display. Left: Tactical Situation Display (TSD); Right: Image 
Management Display (IMD) 
Design 
A 2x2 within subjects, fully factorial design was used for the study. The independent 
variables were target uncertainty and time pressure. Target uncertainty consisted of high 
uncertainty images, those with an equal number of distracters similar to the target, and low 
uncertainty images which will contain either all targets or all distracters. The uncertainty that 
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this study attempted to elicit is based on probability. With a mix of half targets and half 
distracters, the probability of making an incorrect distinction is 50%. With either strictly 
distracters or strictly targets, the probability of making an incorrect distinction is lowered, 
thereby reducing uncertainty. A management by exception strategy was utilized to create tiome 
pressure for the primary task. The time pressure consisted of either three or six second time 
limits during the target acquisition task. These times were determined through a small pilot 
study involving two Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Unixersity students, xvhich yielded a mean 
image processing time of lL)53ms. It xxas determined that a three second time limit xvould 
provide adequate time pressure, while a six second time limit xxas long enough to provide little to 
no time pressure. Dependant measures collected were xvorkload, image processing time, and 
accuracy for the primary task. Workload was subjectively reported by participants, while 
accuracy and image processing time were objectively measured by the MIIIRO softxvare. 
Secondary task measures xvere also taken by the MIIIRO softxvare, and will be described later. 
Refer to Table 1 for a graphical depiction of the experimental design. 
Table 1 
Time Pressure 
(seconds) 
3 6 
Loxv 
Task Uncertainty 
High 
30 
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Primary Task 
The primary task during this study was target acquisition. The UAS utilized a high lexel of 
autonomy and did not require the participant to directly control flight. Preset waypoints made up 
the flight path which the UAS followed. Along the flight path, 10 image capture locations were 
preset and images xvere presented to the participants associating each image capture location 
with a target acquisition. The participants were required to view the images collected by the 
aircraft, and verify that the Automatic Target Recognizer (ATR) had correctly selected the 
targets. Each image contained at least one ground vehicle, but a target was not alxvays present. 
Distracters were present in some of the images as well, and were discernable from the targets by 
a combination of color, shade, and hue. The ATR placed a red box around the vehicles it had 
recognized as targets, although the ATR xvas not alxvays correct, and sometimes placed the red 
box around distracters while not placing one around the targets. The reliability of the ATR was 
set to S()°o in order to make sure the participant was verifying that targets had been correctly 
selected. In cases where the ATR had incorrectly designated targets and distracters, the 
participant xvas required to manually select and deselect the images by clicking on the images 
with the mouse. The automation processed the images as is, without participant input, if no 
action was taken within the time limit. 
Primary task performance measures were automatically collected by the MIIIRO softxvare. 
These measures included image processing time and target selection accuracy. 
Secondary Task 
There were three secondary tasks that the participants were required to perform during this 
experiment. The first task consisted of processing Intruder Aircraft (IA) which entered the 
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operational airspace. This task was used to imitate unexpected aircraft which may enter airspace 
during typical UAS operation, which is a highly critical situation, and requires a quick and 
attentive response. The IA was depicted by a red aircraft shaped icon appearing on the display at 
random times during the experiment. This event occurred twice for each trial, and resulted in the 
participant being required to click on the aircraft and enter a predetermined code. 
The second task involved the MMI, which was represented by three round lights organized in 
a line, similar to a horizontal stoplight, displayed on the TSD. The MMI indicated the status of 
the UAS by lighting up the green, yellow, or red light xxhich indicate a state of good health, 
action needed, and urgent action needed, respectively. In order to correct the situation in the 
event that the yellow or red lights are illuminated, the participant needed to click on the light 
panel and correctly tvpe in a text string which was presented to the participant via a pop up 
window after initiating the action. Once the text string xvas entered correctly, the MMI returned 
to a state of good health and illuminated the green light. 
The third task in this experiment required the participant to respond to flight path change 
recommendations made by the automation. "Pop-up threats" were designed into the flight path. 
but x\ ere not visible to the participant until the aircraft had encountered them. When this 
occurred, the automation made a recommendation on a route change to axoid the threat, and the 
participant was required to acknowledge and accept the recommended change before it xxas put 
into effect. The route changes recommended were not alxvays necessary, so the participant had 
the ability to reject the route change in favor of the original flight plan if they decided to do so. 
Data for all three of the additional tasks was automatical!}' collected by the MIIIRO software and 
included the number of events and response times for all MMI, IA, and pop-up threat 
occurrences. 
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A NASA-TLX rating scale was utilized to measure the participants' workload (Hart & 
Staxeland, 1988). The NASA-TLX measure provided an overall workload score based on a 
weighted average of six subscales which include mental demands, physical demands, temporal 
demands, performance effort, and frustration. 
Procedure 
Once each participant arrixed at the lab, they were asked to fill out the consent form 
(Appendix A) and biographical questionnaire (Appendix B). The participant xvas then 
introduced to the NASA-TLX questionnaire (Appendix C), and it was explained to them how to 
fill out the form. There xvas then an introduction to the MIIIRO simulator and the participants 
were informed of the purpose of the experiment. Familiarization with the simulator included an 
instructional session with a hands-on training exercise which covered all possible events that 
occurred during the actual experiment and lasted fixe minutes. If the participant had any 
questions, the}' xvere answered at this time. 
After the participants had been briefed and completed the training session, they began the 
experiment and no additional help was available to them. Each participant completed all of the 
scenarios, the order of which xvas randomized xvith regards to time pressure and image 
uncertainty to avoid any learning effects. Each trial lasted approximately seven minutes and 
immediately following the trial the participants filled out the xvorkload questionnaire. Once this 
was completed, the participants were debriefed and anv further questions were answered. Once 
the entire study was completed, the highest performing participant was contacted to receive 
sioo. 
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Results 
The current study was intended to investigate the effect of time pressure and task 
uncertainty on autonomous unmanned aerial vehicle operator workload and task performance. 
Repeated measures ANOVA s xvere used to analyze each of the effect each independent xariable 
had on the dependant variables: image processing time, image accuracy, MMI processing time, 
IA processing time, pop-up threat processing time, and workload measured by NASA-TLX. An 
alpha value of 0.05 was used to determine significance. 
Image Processing Time 
There were two primary task performance measures collected during this study. The first 
of these xvas image processing time, and the second was image accuracy. Hypothesis 2 stated 
that high task uncertainty would result in lower primary task performance measures, which in 
this case means higher image processing times and lower image accuracy. Hypothesis 5 stated 
that a lower time limit would increase the time pressure on the participants and result in lower 
image accuracy. The means and standard dev iations for image processing time are presented in 
Table 2. To test these hypotheses, an ANOVA was conducted to determine if there was any 
significant difference between the scenarios w ith regard to image processing time and image 
accuracy. The results of the ANOVA for image processing time are presented first, and are 
shown in Table 3. 
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Means and Standard Deviations for Ima^e Processing Times (ms 
95° <> Confidence Interval 
Mean Standard Dev. Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Time Pressure High 2253.92 
Low 2745.32 
Uncertainty High 2417.57 
Low 2581.67 
49.67 
98.80 
77.67 
72.29 
2152.33 
2543.25 
2258.72 
2433.82 
2355.51 
2947.39 
2576.42 
2729.51 
Table 3 
ANOVA Source Table for Image Processing Time (ms) 
Source SS df MS /' p Power 
Uncertainty 807864.30 i 807864.30 5^57 .025- .626 
Time Pressure 7244218.80 1 7244218.80 35.64 .000* 1 
Time Pressure* 1960963.33 1 1960963.33 9.28 .005* .838 
Uneertaint} 
Error (Uneertaint}) 4205627.20 29 145021.63 
Error (Time 5894608.70 29 203262.37 
Pressure) 
*p< .05. 
The effect of uncertainty on image processing time was examined first. These means 
differed significantly at F( 1,29)^5.571, p=.025. An observed power of 0.626 gives backing to 
these results. As shown in Figure 6, low task uneertaint}' produced longer image processing 
times than high task uncertainty, contradicting the prediction made in hypothesis 2. 
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Image Processing Time (ms) 
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Figure 6. Uncertainty effect on image processing time 
The effect of time pressure on image processing time was also analyzed. These means 
differed significantly at F( 1,29)=35.64, p= 000. An observed power of 1.0 adds backing to this 
finding. The results are shown in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. Time pressure effect on image processing time 
In addition to the main effects reported previously, there was a significant interaction 
between time pressure and uncertainty for image processing time. The means and standard 
deviations are presented in Table 4. 
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Table 4 
Means and Standard Deviations for the Interaction of Time Pressure and Uncertainty on Image 
Processing Time (ms) 
95% Confidence Interval 
Time Pressure Uncertainty Mean Standard 
Dev. 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
2299.70 
2208.13 
2535.43 
2955.20 
47.40 
64.69 
132.81 
110.74 
2202.77 
2075.82 
2263.80 
2728.72 
2396.63 
2340.45 
2807.07 
3181.68 
This interaction was found to be significant at F(l,29)=9.28, p=005. The significance of 
this mteraction indicates that at high time pressure, uncertainty has less of an effect than at low 
time pressure. The results of this interaction arc shown in Figure 8. 
Image Processing Time (ms) 
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H— High Uncertainty 
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Low Time Pressure High Time Pressure 
Figure 8. Time pressure by uncertainty image processing time 
linage Accuracy 
Image accuracy is the second of two primary task performance measures collected during 
the study. Again, hypothesis 2 stated that high task uncertainty would result in lower image 
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accuracy and hypothesis 5 stated that a lower time limit would increase the time pressure on the 
participants resulting in lower image accuracy. The means and standard deviations for image 
accuracy are presented in Table 5, and the results of the ANOVA are presented in Table 6. 
Table 5 
Means and Standard Deviations for linage Accuracy (°«>) 
95° o Confidence Interval 
Mean Standard Dev. Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Time Pressure High S4.67 
Low S4.35 
Uncertainty High 92.67 
Low 76.35 
2.31 
2.05 
1.24 
3.18 
79.94 
80.17 
90.13 
69.86 
89.39 
88.53 
95.20 
82.84 
Table 6 
ANOVA Source Table for Image Accuracy ("») 
Source 
Uncertainty 
Time Pressure 
Time Pressure* 
Uncertainty 
Error (Uneertaint)) 
Error (Time 
Pressure) 
SS 
7987.01 
3.01 
11^7.01 
5793.24 
2147.24 
df 
1 
1 
1 
29 
29 
MS 
7987.01 
3.01 
1197.01 
199.77 
74.04 
/ 
3C).98 
.041 
18.73 
/' 
.000* 
.842 
.000* 
Power 
1 
.054 
.987 
* /?< .05 . 
The effect of time pressure on image accuracx was anah/ed, and the means did not 
demonstrate a significant difference at F( L2C)HU)41. p=.S42. thus hypothesis 5 is not supported 
for image accuracx. The means for uncertainty differed significantly at F( 1.2L))-3e)»S.p=.()()0. 
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Hypothesis 2 stated that high uncertainty would result in lower image accuracy, which is 
contradicted by these results, shown in Figure 9. 
Image Accuracy(%) 
92.67 
Figure 9. Uncertainty effect on image accuracy 
A significant interaction was also found for image accuracy F(l,29)=18.73, p=.000. The 
means and standard deviations are presented in Table 7, and the interaction is shown in Figure 
10. 
Table 7 
Means and Standard Deviations for the Interaction of Time Pressure and Uncertainty on Image 
Accuracy (%) 
Time Pressure 
High 
Low 
U icertainty 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
Mean 
89.67 
79.67 
73.03 
95.67 
Standard 
Dev. 
1.89 
3.54 
3.20 
1.24 
95% Confidi 
Lower Bound 
85.81 
72.43 
66.50 
93.13 
:nce Interval 
Upper Bound 
93.53 
86.91 
79.57 
98.20 
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Figure 10. Time Pressure by uncertainty image accuracy 
MMI Processing Time 
In addition to the primary task perfonnance measures, there were also three secondary 
perfonnance measures collected during this study. These secondary task performance measures 
include MMI processing time, IA processing time, and the pop-up threat processing time. 
Hypothesis 3 stated that high task uncertainty would result in lower secondary task performance 
measures, which in this case means higher processing times for all secondary tasks. Hypothesis 
6 stated that a lower time limit would result in higher performance on secondary tasks, meaning 
lower processing times on all secondary tasks. Hypothesis 8 also stated an interaction to occur 
between time limit and task uncertainty with regards to secondary task performance. To test 
these hypotheses, an ANOVA was conducted for each secondary task. MMI processing time 
was analyzed first. The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 8, followed by the 
ANOVA results presented in Table 9. 
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Table 8 
Means and Standard Deviations for MMI Processiim Time (ms) 
05° <> Confidence Interval 
Mean Standard De\. Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Time Pressure High 7984.90 366.08 7236.19 8733.61 
Low 8227.78 365.13 7481.01 8974.55 
Uncertainty High 8054.55 359.81 7318.66 8790.44 
Low 8158.13 365.68 7410.23 8906.04 
Table 9 
ANOVA Source Table for MMI Processing Time (ms) 
Source SS df' MS ? /? Power 
Uneertaint} 321885.21 i 321885.21 232 ^33 .075 
Time Pressure 1769769.41 1 1769769.41 1.083 .307 .172 
Time Pressure* 1.023xc7 1 1.023\e7 7.156 .012* .734 
Uncertainty 
Error (Uncertainty) 4.019xe7 29 1385793.62 
Error (Time 4.74()xe7 2^ 1634403.10 
Pressuie) 
*/>< .05. 
The means for the effect of uncertainty on MMI processing time did not differ 
simiificantlv at F( 1,29)=.232, p^.633. which does not support hypothesis 3. The means for the 
effect of time pressure on MMI processing time also did not differ significantly at 
F( 1.29)—1.083. p=.307. which does not support hypothesis 6. An interaction between time 
pressure and uneertaint} however, was found to be significant at F( 1.29)= 7.1 56. p -012 . with an 
obsened power of .734. The means and standard dex iations for this interaction are presented in 
Table 10, and the results are shown in Figure 11. 
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Table 10 
Means and Standard Deviations for the Interaction of Time Pressure and Uncertainty on MMI 
Processing Time (ms) 
95% Confidence Interval 
Time Pressure Uncertainty Mean Standard 
Dev. 
Lowrer Bound Upper Bound 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
8225.13 
7744.67 
7883.97 
8571.60 
397.95 
412.17 
368.21 
405.83 
7411.23 
6901.69 
7130.90 
7741.58 
9039.03 
8587.64 
8637.03 
9401.62 
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Figure 11. Time pressure by uncertainty MMI processing time 
IA Processing Time 
The next secondary task measure presented here is IA processing time. Hypothesis 3 
stated that high task uncertainty would result in higher IA processing times, while hypothesis 6 
stated that a lower time limit would result in lower IA processing times. Hypothesis 8 also stated 
an interaction to occur between time limit and task uncertainty with regards to IA processing 
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times. The means and standard deviations for IA processing time are presented in Table 1 1, and 
the ANOVA table for IA processing time is presented in Table 12. 
Table 11 
Means and Standard Deviations for IA Processing Time (ms) 
95"o Confidence Inter\al 
Mean Standard Dex. Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Time Pressure High 6357.40 314.51 5714.15 7000.65 
Low 5825.08 295.65 5220.41 6429.76 
Uncertainty High 5753.38 261.21 5219.16 6287.61 
Low 6429.10 380.50 5650.89 7207.31 
Table 12 
ANOVA Source Table for IA Processing Time (ms) 
Source SS df' MS / ~p Power 
Uncertainty 1.370\c7 1 1.370\c7 25\ 424 .334 
Time Pressure 8500831.01 1 8500831.01 2.20 .148 .300 
Time Pressure* 1.325xc7 1 1.325\c7 2.915 .098 .379 
Uncertainty 
Error (Uneertaint)) 1.583xe8 29 5458427.56 
Error (Time 3857586.92 29 3857586 92 
Pressure) 
* p< .05. 
The main effect of uncertainty on IA processing time was not found to be significant at 
F( 1,29)=2.5 1, p= 1 24, which does not support hypothesis 3 The main effect of time pressure on 
IA processing time was also not found to be significant at F( L29)=2.20. p-.14N which does not 
support lnpothesis 6. Lastly, the interaction of time pressure and uneertaint} was also not found 
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High 
Low 
High 
Low 
6351.87 
6362.93 
5154.90 
6495.27 
3X9.51 
459.87 
289.77 
508.90 
5555.24 
5422.40 
4562.25 
5454.44 
7148.50 
7303.47 
5747.55 
7536.09 
to be significant at F( 1,29)^2.915, p=. 098, and thus does not support hypothesis 8. The means 
and standard deviations for this interaction are presented in Table 13. 
Table 13 
Means and Standard Deviations for the Interaction of Time Pressure and Uncertainty on IA 
Processing Time (ms) 
95°u Confidence Interval 
Time Pressure Uncertainty Mean Standard Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Dew 
Hi eh 
Low 
Pop-up Threat Processing Time 
The last secondary task measure collected in the current study is pop-up threat processing 
time. This measure is the time taken to respond to a recommended flight path change due to a 
threat which pops-up during the simulation. In the same fashion as the other sccondai) tasks, 
hxpothesis 3 stated that high task uneertaint} would result in higher pop-up threat processing 
times, hypothesis 6 stated that a lower time limit would result in lower pop-up threat processing 
times, and hypothesis 8 also stated an interaction to occur between time limit and task 
uncertainty with regards to pop-up threat processing times. The means and standard deviations 
are presented in Table 14, and the ANOVA table for pop-up threat processing time is presented 
in Table 15. 
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Table 14 
Moans and Standard Dc\ iations for Pop-up Threat Processing Time (ins) 
95"(i Confidence Interval 
Mean Standard Dev. Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Time Pressure High 2896.28 150.53 2588.42 3204.15 
Low 2966.98 109.36 2743.33 3190.64 
Uncertainty High 2776.58 124.31 2522.35 3030.82 
Low 3086.68 125.77 2829.45 3343.91 
Table 15 
ANOVA Source Table for Pop-up Threat Processing Time (ms) 
Source SS Jf MS / p Pow er 
Uncertainty 2884860.30 i 2884860.30 6.306 .018* .680 
Time Pressure 149954.70 1 149954.70 .228 .637 .075 
Time Pressure* 4247298.13 1 4247298.13 6.941 .013* .721 
Uncertainty 
Error (Uncertainty) 1.327xe7 29 457485.27 
Error (Time 1.909xe7 29 658290.08 
Pressuie) 
*/><.()5. 
The main effect for time pressure on pop-up threat processing time did not show 
simiificance at F( 1,29)-.22K. p=.637, thus not supporting hypothesis 6. The main effect for 
uncertainty on pop-up threat processing time did show a significant difference at F( 1.29)=6.306. 
p-.018, and an obsened power of .680 lends some support to the results. These results 
contradict the prediction made by hypothesis 3. that high uncertainty would lead to higher 
processing times. The results are shown in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12. Uncertainty effect on pop-up threat processing time 
Additionally, an interaction between time pressure and uncertainty was found to have 
significance for pop-up threat processing time at F(l,29)=6.941, p=.013. These results contradict 
the prediction made by hypothesis 8. The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 
16, and the interaction is shown in Figure 13. 
Table 16 
Means and Standard Deviations for the Interaction of Time Pressure and Uncertainty on Pop-up 
Threat Processing Time (ms) 
Time Pressure 
High 
Low 
Uncertainty 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
Mean 
2553.10 
3239.47 
3000.07 
2933.90 
Standard 
Dev. 
189.78 
180.27 
138.99 
130.57 
95% Confidei 
Lower Bound 
2164.95 
2870.77 
2715.80 
2666.86 
ice Interval 
Upper Bound 
2941.25 
3608.16 
3284.34 
3200.95 
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Figure 13. Time pressure by uncertainty pop-up threat processing time 
Workload 
Workload was measured subjectively using the NASA-TLX after each scenario. The 
subjective ratings were on a scale ranging from 0 to 100, with 100 being the highest level of 
workload and 0 being the lowest. Hypotheses 1, 4, and 7 refer to workload. Hypothesis 1 stated 
that high uncertainty would result in higher workload ratings, and hypothesis 4 stated that high 
time pressure would also result in higher workload ratings. Hypothesis 7 stated that an 
interaction would exist between time pressure and uncertainty with regards to workload, and that 
uncertainty will have less of an effect on workload for scenarios presenting high time pressure 
than for scenarios presenting low time pressure. The means and standard deviations for 
workload are presented in Table 1 7, and the ANOVA table for workload is presented in Table 
18. 
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Table 17 
Means and Standard Dex iations for Workload 
95" <> Confidence Intenal 
Mean Standard Dew Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Time Pressure High 44.25 
Low 38.72 
Uncertainty High 41.12 
Low 41.85 
3.23 
3.30 
2.96 
3.44 
37.64 
31.97 
3 5.OK 
34.82 
50.86 
45.46 
47.17 
48.87 
Table 18 
ANOVA Source Table for Workload 
Source SS <//' MS / p Power 
1 15.66 2MJ9 jsTl .073 
1 918.59 7.512 .010* .755 
1 37.02 .263 .612 .079 
Uncertainty 
Time Pressure 
Time Pressure* 
Uncertainty 
15.66 
918.59 
37.02 
Error (Uncertainty) 2168.10 29 74.76 
Error (Time 3546.26 29 122.29 
Pressure) 
* p< .05. 
The main effect for uncertainty did not show a significant difference at F( 1.29)=.209, 
p—.65 1. The effect of time pressure on workload did show significance at F( L29)=7.512. p—.01. 
With an observed power of.755, these results lend support to hypothesis 4, that high time 
pressure would produce higher workload. The means and standard deviations for the interaction 
of time pressure and uncertainty on workload are presented in Table 19. This interaction did not 
produce significant results at F( 1,29)-.263. p-.612. which does not support hxpothesis ~\ The 
results for the effect of time pressure on workload are presented on Figure 14. 
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Table 19 
Means and Standard Deviations for the Interaction of Time Pressure and Uncertainty on 
Workload 
95% Confidence Interval 
Time Pressure Uncertainty Mean Standard 
Dev. 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
High 
Low 
44.44 
44.06 
37.80 
39.63 
3.20 
3.97 
3.36 
3.54 
37.90 
35.94 
30.92 
32.39 
50.98 
52.17 
44.68 
46.88 
Figure 14. Time pressure effect on workload 
Discussion 
The objective of this study was to examine the effect of time pressure and task 
uncertainty on operator task performance and workload when conducting an unmanned aerial 
vehicle operation. This study was intended to advance current knowledge about the workload 
associated with operating a highly autonomous UAS, particularly with technology which can 
provide uncertainty during tasks, and during operations which are extremely time sensitive. The 
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aim is to provide knowledge which can be applied to the design of future UAS's in order to 
improve operator performance through appropriate levels of workload. This knowledge 
potentialK' includes the amount of uncertainty an operator can deal with while still maintaining a 
high level of performance, as well as what level of time pressure the operator can handle before 
performance begins to deteriorate. The results of this study are discussed here, organized into 
three main areas of interest: primary task performance measures, secondary task performance 
measures, and workload. 
Primary Task Performance Measures 
There were two primary task performance measures collected during this study: image 
processing time and image accuracy. Image processing time showed significance for both level 
of uncertainty and time pressure. There was also found to be a significant interaction of time 
pressure and uncertainty with regards to image processing time. Low uncertainty images 
produced higher image processing times than high uncertainty images. This directly contradicts 
predictions made about uncertainty and image processing time. It was expected that the more 
uncertainty an image contained, based on probability, the more time it would take the participant 
to process that image. It is possible that the different images created different scanning patterns 
within the participants, and the time it took to scan the images created a difference in processing 
time. Another possible explanation for these results involves the type of uncertainty chosen as a 
variable. Uncertainty as a probability simply claims that if 100% of the items displayed on the 
image are either targets or distracters, there will be little uncertainty about which the\ are. 
Images that display 50% targets and 50% distracters would constitute higher uncertainty for the 
participant. This ma\ not be an accurate representation of uneertaint)' when making quick 
decisions during this stuck. When viewing images which contain both targets and distracters. it 
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may be easier to determine a difference between the two with onl\ a quick glance, due to the 
immediate comparison available. When viewing images with strictly targets or strictly 
distracters, there is no immediate comparison available, making it necessary to examine the 
image more closely. This is discussed further in the Recommendations for Further Research 
section. 
There was also significance found for time pressure on image processing time. Low time 
pressure produced longer image processing times than high time pressure. The fact that the 
participants were under more time pressure to process the images possibly led them to hurry 
when performing this task. This may negatively affect the accuracy of their responses, but the 
image processing time would decrease in this case. 
The interaction of time pressure and uneertaint)' showed significant results for image 
processing time as well. High uncertainty images were processed faster than low uncertainty 
images at low time pressures, but processed slower at high time pressures. In other words, the 
effect of time pressure showed a greater change for low uncertainty images than for high 
uncertainty images. This interaction was not hypothesized to be significant, but a possible 
explanation for this occurrence is related to the previous statement about the nature of the 
uncertainty of the images used. When not pressured for time, participants may have been able to 
more carefully examine the images which did not contain a direct comparison within them. 
When under a more stringent time constraint, participants may have resorted to guessing. 
resulting in lower processing times. Reynolds (2009) came to a similar conclusion, and 
theorized that for processing non-obvious images, participants may simply guess. 
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The other primary performance measure collected during this study was image accuracy. 
There was a significant interaction found between time pressure and uncertainty for image 
accuracy. Uncertainty demonstrated a stronger effect at low time pressure than at high time 
pressure. This, again, may support the argument that images which have both targets and 
distracters provide a direct comparison, and lead to higher accuracy. There was also significance 
found tor the main effect of uncertainty on image accuracy. Low uncertainty images yielded a 
lower accuracy score than high uncertainty images, which contradicts hypothesis 2, but may 
support the previously stated argument that when participants have no immediate comparisons 
available to them, the uncertainty may actually increase. 
SccondaiT Task Performance Measures 
Secondary task measures were used as another measure of workload, attempting to 
determine how much excess capacity was axailable while performing the primary task. There 
were three secondary task performance measures involved in the current study: MMI processing 
time. IA processing time, and pop-up threat processing time. Overall, the main effects of the 
secondary task measures did not agree with the subjective workload ratings from the NASA-
TLX. The secondaiy task measures showed no significance for the effect of time pressure while 
the workload ratings did show significance. Uneertaint)' did show a significant main effect for 
two of the three secondaiy tasks, while not showing a significant effect on the subjective ratings. 
This may indicate that the secondary task measures were not an adequate measure of excess 
capacit) as intended, or that the NASA-TLX is simply a more sensitive measure. 
MMI processing required the participants to respond to either a yellow or red light within 
the indicator, by clicking on the light and typing in a number string gi\en to them. MMI 
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processing time showed no significant results for the main effects of either time pressure or 
uncertainty. This lack of significance does not support hypotheses 3 or 6, which both stated an 
ettect on secondary performance measures due to uncertainty and time pressure respectively. 
The interaction of the two however, was shown to contain significance. Again, at low time 
pressure, scenarios with low uncertainty produced higher MMI processing times than scenarios 
with high uncertainty, and the opposite is true at high time pressure. Due to the participants 
being instRicted that image processing should be given priority over secondary tasks, it is exident 
that when participants take longer to process the images, as in the case of the low uncertainty 
images, secondary task performance is affected. This may be an explanation which fits the data 
for the interaction, given the data for image processing time, as it contains the same pattern of 
interaction. 
IA processing required the participants to respond to a red aircraft icon which would 
appear on the tactical situation display, by clicking on the icon and typing in a code gixen to 
them. IA processing time yielded no significant differences for effect of time pressure, 
uncertainty, or their interaction. This again, does not support either hypothesis 3 or 6 for 
performance on secondary task measures. A possible explanation for this lack of significance is 
the number of IA e\ cuts experienced during the trials. For MMI events, performance w as 
affected more by primary task because each scenario contained ten instances of MMI events. 
This led to more chances for the tasks to overlap and have an effect. IA events on the other 
hand, occurred only twice per trial. With such a few opportunities for the tasks to conflict, the 
uncertainty and time pressure placed on the primary task had little chance to affect performance 
on IA piocessing. 
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The last secondary task measure collected was pop-up threat processing time. Pop-up 
threat processing required the participants to either accept or reject a recommended flight path 
change in order to avoid a threat which had appeared during the simulation. Uncertainty 
demonstrated a significant effect on pop-up threat processing time, with low uncertainty 
resulting in greater processing times than high uncertainty. There was also an interaction 
between uncertainty and time pressure which demonstrated significance. This time however, the 
pattern of the interaction is the opposite of interactions on other tasks. At low time pressure, 
high uncertainty scenarios produced higher processing times than low uncertainty scenarios, and 
vice versa for high time pressure. This may be due to the nature of the task involved with 
processing a pop-up threat, which is something that may require further study. The effect of the 
interaction is greater for high time pressure than for low time pressure, which is in contrast with 
hypothesis 8. 
Workload 
Workload was assessed using subjective ratings from the NASA-TLX after each trial. 
The main effect of uneertaint)' was not shown to be significant on subjective workload ratings. 
which contradicts hypothesis 1. The interaction of time pressure and uneertaint)' also failed to 
show significance, in contrast with hypothesis 7 The lack of significance for uncertainty, as 
well as the interaction of time pressure and uncertainty, does not support the argument that lack 
of direct comparison played a role in how the participants dealt with the images at different time 
pressures. This idea will be discussed further in Recommendations for Further Research section. 
Time pressure however, did show significance for the mam effect on subjective workload. High 
time pressure produced higher ratings of subjective workload among the participants, which 
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supports hypothesis 4. Pre\ ious studies using a timeout feature for management by exception 
have not shown any significance for subjective workload, and it was theorized that participants 
were not utilizing the timeout feature because the time limit was too long (Reynolds, 2009). This 
was the basis for the current study, to limit the time the participant had to respond to the images 
in order to create greater time pressure associated with the task, and determine how this would 
affect workload. These results demonstrated that workload can be increased by implementing a 
more stringent time pressure during an image identification task. 
Study Limitations 
This study was based on previous research using the MIIIRO test bed (Liu, Wasson, & 
Yinccnzi, 2008: Reynolds, 2009). The previous studies showed difficult)' in manipulating 
workload through lexel of automation, and quality of images was reasoned to be a possible 
explanation for this. The current study set out to in\ estigate whether image uncertainty could 
contribute to operator workload. In attempting to define uncertainty however, sexeral 
possibilities arose as methods for manipulating uncertainty. The method chosen was based on 
probability, that is. if an image contains strictly targets, the participant has no chance of 
erroneously selecting a distracter, leax ing little uncertainty. If the image however, contains half 
targets and half distracters, the participant has only a 50% chance of making the correct 
selection, leading to high uneertaint)'. This method of eliciting uneertaint) max' haxe been biased 
due to the nature of the images being presented. The images used were very low resolution 
pictures of tanks against a generic background. This led to the potential for participants to 
mistake two targets or two distracters as opposites when there xxas no actual difference available 
for immediate comparison. The confound is that adding the distracters to the targets may 
facilitate target selection. 
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Additionally, the time pressure applied to this study may haxe contributed to differences 
in image processing time betxveen scenarios. The pilot study found a mean image processing 
time ot 1953ms, and it xvas determined that three seconds would provide a high enough time 
pressure to elicit a xvorkload response. By allowing the simulation to time out images after three 
seconds however, there is potential for ceiling effects to occur. If participants were unable to 
respond to the images before the time limit passed, true performance on image processing time 
may not have been collected. This could occur if the participant xvas processing a secondary task 
when an image was presented to them. The average amount of images which were allowed to 
time out through all four trials xvas less than nine percent, but there is still potential for image 
processing time to be misrepresented. 
Practical Implications 
The future of UAS operation, both abroad and within national airspace, holds many 
opportunities. The tasks xxhich can be performed more safely and efficiently by an unmanned 
vehicle are numerous, but in order to implement the use of UAS"s for these tasks, more needs to 
be done to assess the capabilities and limitations of the systems. Factors that influence xvorkload 
in a UAS operator need to be further understood in order to avoid performance detriments due to 
workload which is either too high or too low. 
Time pressure plays such an integral role in determining how well a task can be 
performed, particularly a complex task such as UAS operation. It w ill be important to 
understand factors which increase time pressure, and be able to alleviate some of those factors, if 
UASN are to be implemented for some of the tasks for which they haxe so much potential. It 
w ill be necessary to understand when and how to best assist a UAS operator in order to axoid the 
cttects of time pressure. This is also true for the uncertainty of tasks often performed by UAS 
operators. An understanding of how uncertainty affects performance, as well as how it affects 
xvorkload, can contribute to methods of alleviating uncertainty through things such as automated 
decision assistance. This study demonstrated a significant effect of uneertaint)' on processing 
times for images as well as secondary tasks. The time differences however xvere small enough 
that they may not warrant any design changes. Though statistically significant, in a practical 
manner, the time differences may be negligible outside of life and death situations. This is a 
topic which needs to be studied further, and reviewed before implementing design strategies. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
Highly autonomous vehicles, like the one simulated for this study, can open the door for 
one operator to supervise multiple vehicles at the same time. The xvorkload involved with 
supervising multiple UAS's is unknown, but with knowledge about the factors xxhich influence 
workload with one UAS, future research can focus on implementing these factors xvith multiple 
UAS's to determine how many vehicles one person can supervise. Future research may want to 
include time pressure as a factor when assessing performance while operating more than one 
vehicle. 
There is a lot of uncertainty involved with UAS operation, due to the operator being 
separated from the vehicle and the environment it is in. Because of the increased level of 
uncertainty in UAS operation in comparison to manned flight, uncertainty is still a concept 
which can provide insight into performance and workload during UAS flight. The definition of 
uncertainty used in this study led to unexpected results, possiblv due to the ability of participants 
to compare images directly. Future research should focus on uncertainty in a different manner in 
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order to provide a clearer definition of factors which contribute to it. By further understanding 
uncertainty when conducting UAS operations, designs can be implemented to reduce the 
uneertaint)' which contributes to higher workload and lower performance. 
Conclusion 
The role of UAS's w ithin the military has grown considerably in the last decade, and can 
do the same within the national airspace in the near future. The capabilities of UAS's provide a 
much safer and efficient method for performing a number of tasks. There are still a number of 
concerns with regard to safety of UAS flight which need to be addressed before the full potential 
of this technology can be realized. The traditional method of dealing with human factors 
concerns, is to design the human out of the loop, and rely completely on automation. This 
method does not erase human factors concerns however, but merely creates new problems which 
must be solved. It is important to understand the human component of these sv stems. and be 
able to solve some of the issues through design which provides the abilitv' for all components of 
the system to perform at optimum levels. It will remain important for studies such as this one. 
continue to be conducted to improve the design of UAS's in order to further the use of the 
technology. 
This study has contributed to the knowledge of UAS operation, and the factors which 
mav influence performance and workload within the UAS operator. Significant workload effects 
were shown to be elicited by time pressure, as well as effects on performance. While uncertainty 
still remains an area of little understanding, future research can investigate different vvavs to 
implement uneertaint)' in order to ascertain the effects it may have on UAS operators. It will be 
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important for future research to apply the findings of this study to more complex tasks involving 
multiple unmanned vehicles, as well as other tasks for which UAS\s may prove useful. 
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Appendix A 
IRB Number: 10-302 
Informed Consent Form 
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Time Pressure and Task Uncertainty Study 
Conducted by Trevor Peterson 
Advisor: Dr. Dahai Liu 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
600 S. Clyde Moms Blvd, Daytona Beach, FL 32114 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of time pressure and task uncertainty on 
performance and workload. This experiment consists of one session that will last approximately 
forty five minutes. During this session, you will be asked to complete a computer-based UAS 
simulation trial and fill out a questionnaire regarding your perceived feeling of workload. 
Your participation in this study will help us determine an appropriate level of automation 
and help distinguish potential pilot candidates for future UASs. There are no known risks 
associated with this experiment. The data collected from your participation will remain 
confidential. You will be compensated for your participation with extra credit in an 
undergraduate course and will be eligible to receive a SI00.00 cash prize for best overall 
performance. You may terminate your participation at any time. 
Thank you for your participation. If you have any questions, please ask during the 
experiment, or call Trevor Peterson at 970.988.9410 or Dr. Dahai Liu at 386.226.6214 
Statement of Consent 
I acknowledge that my participation m this experiment is entirely voluntary and 
that I am free to withdraw at any time. I have been informed as to the general scientific purposes 
of the experiment and that I will receive extra credit for participation in this studv and will be 
eligible to receive SI00.00 in the event that I have the best overall task performance in the entire 
study. Prize money is contingent on completion of the study. 
I acknowledge that I have had the opportunity to obtain additional information regarding 
the study and that any questions I have raised have been answered to my full satisfaction. 
I hav e read and fully understand the consent form and I sign it freely and v oluntanK . 
Participant's Name: 
Participant's Signature: _ _ _ _ _ ^ _ _ _ Date 
Experimenter Signature: Date 
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Appendix B 
Biographical Information Questionnaire 
I.D.#: Task: Date: 
Please fill in the blanks or circle the appropriate response. 
1. What is your age? years 
2. What is your gender? M / F 
3. Do you have normal or corrected to 20,20 vision? Yes / No 
4. Are you color blind? Yes / No 
5. Are you: R-handed / L handed 
6. How many hours per w eek do you use computers: hours 
7 On a scale of 1 to 5. what is your confidence level in using computers: 
LOW confidence 1 2 3 4 5 HIGH confidence 
8. On average, how many hours per week do you spend playing computer games'7 
0-5 6-10 11-13 16-20 21-25+ 
9. What type of genre of gaming are \ou most accustomed to playing? 
Action Adventure Role-Playing Strategy 
Simulation 
10. Have vou had any other experience participating in unmanned aircraft simulation'7 Yes / 
No 
1 1. Do you have anv experience fl\ mg unmanned aircraft or remote controlled aircraft? Yes ' 
No 
If so, please explain: . 
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Appendix C 
NASA Task Load Index (TLX) Form (Presented after the completion of each trial) 
^ are interested in your subjective experience of workload Workload is a difficult concept to define precisely. 
"jut a simple one to understand generally. The factors that influence vour experience of workload may come from 
ie task itself, your teehngs about vour own performance, how much effort \ou put in, or the stress and frustration 
vou telt. 
C nc way to find out about workload is to ask people to describe the feelings they experienced Because workload 
may be caused by many different factors, we would like vou to evaluate several of them indiv iduallv rather than 
lumping them into a single global evaluation of overall workload This set of six rating scales was developed for 
you to use in ev atuatmg your experiences during the test trial. 
Please indicate the level of workload you experienced on each of the 6 scales by circling the line at the point 
which best reflects the level of workload vou experienced. The ends of the scales are labeled to indicate very low 
and very high workload. Points in between those end points represent intermediate values of workload. Please 
note that the Performance scale goes from Good on the left to Bad on the right This order has been c on fusing for 
some people. 
EFFORT — 1 low hard did you have to work (mentally and physically) to accomplish your level of performance? 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
Low High 
PERFORMANCE — 1 low successful do you think you were in accomplishing the goals of the task set by the 
experimenter (or yourself)0 How satisfied were you with vour performance in accomplishing these goals'* 
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i 
Good Poor 
FRUSTRATION LEVEL — How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed, and annoyed versus secure, gratified, 
content, relaxed, and complacent did vou feel during the task? 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
Low Ni«h 
TEMPORAL DEMAND — How much time pressure did you feel due to the rate or pace at which the tasks or 
events occurred'? Was the pace slow and leisurelv. or rapid and frantic? 
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
Low High 
MENTAL DEMAND — How much mental and perceptual activ ity was required (e.g . thinking, deciding. 
calculating, remembering, looking, searching)9 Was the task easy or demanding, simple or complex, forgiv mg or 
exacting ° 
| I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
Low Nitfh 
P H V S I C A L D E M A N D llow much phvsical activitv was required (e.g.. pushing, pulling, turning, controlling. 
activating)'? Was the task ph\sicallv easy or demanding, slow oi brisk, slack or strenuous, restful or laborious? 
| I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
Low Mi^h 
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NASA Task Load Index (TLX) Weighting Form 
ie forms you filled out included six rating scale factors that can influence workload. We are interested in your 
assessment of the relative contribution of these factors to your experience of workload. 
eople van' in their opinion of what contributes to workload. For example, some people feel that mental or 
temporal demands are the essential aspects of workload regardless of the effort they expended or the performance 
they achieved. Others feel that if they performed well, the workload must have been low and if they performed 
poorly, the workload must have been high. Yet others feel that effort or feelings of frustration are the most 
important factors in workload, and so on. 
In addition, the factors that create lev els of workload differ depending on the task. For example, some tasks might 
be difficult because they must be completed very quickly. Others may seem easy or hard because of the intensity of 
mental or physical effort required. Yet others feel difficult because they cannot be performed well, no matter how 
much effort is expended. 
The evaluation you are about to perform is a technique developed by NASA to assess the relative importance of the 
six factors that were included in the workload rating scale in determining how much workload you experienced 
across all the test trials you just completed. 
Below is a list of pairs of rating scale titles (for example Effort vs. Mental demand). For each pair, please circle the 
item that was more important to your experience of workload across all the test trials you just completed. 
MENTAL DEMAND 
TEMPORAL DEMAND 
PHYSICAL DEMAND 
EFFORT 
PERFORMANCE 
TEMPORAL DEMAND 
MENTAL DEMAND 
PERFORMANCE 
EFFORT 
TEMPORAL DEMAND 
EFFORT 
PHYSICAL DEMAND 
FRUSTRATION-
MENTAL DEMAND 
FRUSTRATION 
VS 
VS 
VS 
VS 
VS 
VS 
VS 
VS 
VS 
VS 
VS 
VS 
VS 
VS 
VS 
PHYSICAL DEMAND 
MENTAL DEMAND 
TEMPORAL DEMAND 
PERFORMANCE 
FRUSTRATION 
PERFORMANCE 
PERFORMANCE 
PHYSICAL DEMAND 
FRUSTRATION 
EFFORT 
MENTAL DEMAND 
EFFORT 
TEMPORAL DEMAND 
FRUSTRATION 
PHYSICAL DEMAND 
